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Abstract
We consider redistributional taxation between people with and
without human capital if education is endogenous and if individu-
als di¤er in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their
ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it
generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistrib-
utive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and
increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surpris-
ing that this rather indirect e¤ect can overcompensate them for the
income loss from taxation and make the overcondent want higher
taxes than the less condent do. The results, however, turn out to be
in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution
among young individuals.
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1 Introduction
A common theme in life and in literature suggests that people are leftist,
socialist, even communist, or at least have strong egalitarian redistributional
preferences when they are young, and as they grow older they tend to be-
come conservative, particularly if their professional career had been success-
ful. This shift in redistributional preferences is often attributed to the change
in income position and its variability. As has been pointed out by Sinn (1995),
young people face a situation in which future income is uncertain and which
they cannot fully control. These people may want future redistributional
taxation as a means of insurance, but, once their own position in the in-
come distribution has been determined, the demand for redistribution that
stems from the insurance motive disappears. Piketty (1995) emphasizes the
importance of mobility experience for redistributional preferences: mobility
experience may be related to perceptions about the incentive cost of redistri-
bution and may account for di¤erences in redistribution in di¤erent countries.
Income dynamics and social mobility also play a major role in a number of
analyses that consider redistributional preferences and voting outcomes on
redistributive taxation. Individuals who expect a major change in their in-
come will take this into consideration when expressing their attitudes about
governmental income redistribution.1
Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), who consider the Russian situation, nd
that own expectations about own future welfare are very relevant for redis-
tributional preferences. Empirically, high current income makes individuals
favor less redistribution (see, e.g., Fong 2001, Piketty 1995, 1999, Gilens
1999, p.51, or Kluegel and Smith 1986). This is a result that is robust with
respect to the addition of socio-demographic characteristics. However, other
variables also matter, and these can considerably reduce the share that in-
come contributes to redistributional preferences (Piketty 1999). One aspect is
whether individuals think that success is determined by luck or is the reward
for personal e¤ort. This, and some further aspects that motivate attitudes
towards redistribution, are surveyed and analysed empirically in Fong (2001).
1Two papers analysing some of these aspects are Glazer and Konrad (1994) and Bén-
abou and Ok (2001). Glazer and Konrad (1994) show that rich people may want to live
in a neighborhood where a persistent majority of poor makes sure there will also be some
redistribution of income in the future if there is some risk that they themselves will become
poor then. Bénabou and Ok (2001) show that the "prospect of upward mobility" may
yield a political majority that opposes redistribution.
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Perceived benets from poverty reduction could, for instance, be based on
altruism or group loyalty (Luttmer 2001) or on the crime reducing e¤ect of
poverty reduction (Pauly 1973, Piven and Cloward 1971).2
In this paper we highlight an additional, intra-generational dimension
along which redistributional preferences can di¤er. This dimension can mod-
erate or even reverse the relationship between own income expectations and
preferences for future redistributional taxation, even though it is based purely
on narrowly dened selsh behavior. Future redistributional taxation a¤ects
the choice of whether to invest in human capital. In turn, redistributional
taxation a¤ects the scarcity rents of human capital. We characterize con-
ditions where individuals, who perceive their own talent as high and are
therefore likely to benet greatly from human capital investment, may pre-
fer even more redistribution than those who are less condent about their
talent.3
We consider a large set of individuals who are all symmetric ex ante, ex-
cept for their beliefs about what they can gain from investing in education.
Some individuals expect to be able to gain little. Some individuals have inter-
mediate expectations about what they can gain, and, nally, some individuals
expect to earn a high education premium. In line with the large and growing
literature in economics that draws on empirical observations from psychol-
ogy about perception biases regarding own ability, we could also assume that
these di¤erences are simply based on di¤erent psychological biases. Accord-
ingly, the three groups may be called undercondent, adequately condent
and overcondent, respectively. For our results it does not matter if these
di¤erences in expected education premiums are truein the sense that they
are based on heterogenous, but true perceptions about own ability, or are
caused by perception biases.
For a given cost of investment in education, the investment incentives of
the three types of individual will be di¤erent, and they may also di¤er in their
2A policy of public enforcement of redistribution is typically derived from these motiva-
tions in order to overcome the free-rider problem that emerges in the context of voluntary
redistribution among the group of well-o¤ who may all benet if the poor receive more
support that has been highlighted by Hochman and Rogers (1974).
3Insurance aspects of redistributive taxation (e.g., Varian 1980, Sinn 1996) and other
means that make the wage distribution more egalitarian (see, e.g., Agell and Lommerud
1992 for an analysis of wage compression) have received considerable attention. We will
assume risk neutral individuals throughout, in order to isolate and highlight the e¤ects we
consider.
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preferences for income redistribution. Those who expect higher own returns
from education investment will be more likely to invest in education and this
is unsurprising. However, the redistributional preferences can be surprising.
We show that the individuals who are highly condent may prefer more
redistribution than the individuals who are less condent or even have no
condence at all.4
The intuitive reason is as follows. The less condent individuals are un-
likely to invest in education and will not pay the tax on the education pre-
mium. They would like to maximize the per capita net transfers to the
individuals who do not invest in education, and, in this respect, they face a
La¤er type trade-o¤: a higher tax reduces the tax base. The highly condent
individuals collectively may want to exclude others from acquiring education,
because the smaller the set of highly educated persons, the higher their skill
premium. Hence, the highly condent also face a trade-o¤: the higher the
tax they have to pay, the larger the skill premium they can obtain. Which of
the most preferred taxes of the two groups is the higher is unclear, as they
optimize along di¤erent trade-o¤s.5
For our analysis it does not matter whether education investment endows
individuals with skills that improve their productivity in the labor market
as is predominantly assumed in the human capital theory (Becker 1962), or
whether the productivity increase is the result of education as a lter and
assignment process, as has been discussed by Arrow (1973).
In the theoretical analysis we assume that all individuals di¤er only in
their perceptions about their own ability. We need not discriminate between
whether these perceptions are based on true di¤erences or simply misper-
ceptions. Indeed, condence biases, and overcondence in particular, are
documented in the psychology literature.6 For the purpose of our analysis,
4A possible candidate for explaining such preferences in a theoretical analysis is risk
aversion. As is known from Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985), self-insurance and self-
protection have non-trivial and partially paradoxical comparative statics. But this ex-
planation is not at work in our framework as we consider risk neutral agents.
5Alternative tools may come to mind when we think about how to increase scarcity rents
for human capital. Note, however, that the group of individuals under consideration cannot
simply erect more classical barriers to entry such as admission rules that are guarded by
professional associations. Such classical barriers make sense only for individuals who are
already "inside" and have passed the barriers that are to be erected, whereas, prior to the
education choice, the individuals who express their redistributional preferences are still
themselves "outside".
6The most relevant evidence in this context is the better than averagee¤ect that has
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we adopt the notion of being highly condent, just condentand lowly
condent.
This irrelevance regarding the causes of di¤erences in condence is also
important when turning to the data. Individuals perceptions matter for
their career decisions, regardless of where these perceptions come from and
whether they are correct or not. Accordingly, those who expect to earn higher
education premiums will self-select into education programmes, whether they
are overly optimistic about their abilities or are simply really better than av-
erage. Hence, the education choice can be seen as a proxy for condence
as regards own benets from the education investment, i.e., for high con-
dence, and when we analyse survey data on redistributional preferences, the
education choice is our proxy for condence.
2 Taxation and education choices
Let there be a continuum of individuals i, with i 2 [0; 1]. Each individual
can abstain from trying to become productive and receive a wage that is
normalized to zero. Alternatively, the person can invest in education. The
cost of investment is e. This can be thought of as the opportunity cost of
time or inconvenience, but it is expressed in terms of its equivalent monetary
income such that e and monetary income can simply be added.
Educated individuals will earn a wage premium w, which is dened as
w = (a  b). (1)
Consider the components of w in (1). First,  is a random variable that
reects the individualscondence in their education productivity. Individ-
uals know that their own productivity is a random variable, and we denote
individual is perceived expected productivity as Ei. Individuals di¤er in
their perceptions, reecting objective di¤erences, or psychological biases.
For concreteness, we focus on a simple distribution of expectations in
which the individuals are allocated among three groups: A0 is the group of
been documented, e.g., by Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich (2001) with respect to judges
assessments of their decisions, or by Svenson (1981) with respect to driving skills. Further
references can be found, for instance, in Squintani (1999) and Heifetz and Spiegel (2000).
Relevant papers considering the relationship between condence and dynamic education
lters are Squintani (1999) and Flåm and Risa (2003). This literature is silent with regard
to redistributive taxation.
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individuals who have high condence, individuals in A1 have intermediate
or just condence, and individuals in A2 have low condence. These are
characterized by the following expected values:
Ei = h > 1, for i 2 A0
Ei = 1, for i 2 A1
Ei = 0, for i 2 A2.
(2)
Without loss of generality we can consider the individuals numbered and
sorted so that the set of highly condent A0 = [0; 0], the set of just condent
A1 = (0; 0 + 1], and the set of individuals with low condence, A2 =
(0+1; 1]. This exhausts the set [0; 1] of all individuals and also determines
the relative size 0, 1 and 1  0   1 of these groups.
Note that, where individualsperceptions are not correct but are biased
with respect to their own ability, individuals have correct beliefs about the
distribution of perceptions of condence etc.
Second, a and b in (1) are positive and exogenous parameters, and  2
[0; 1] is the share of individuals who invest in education. The expected wage
premium is a linear, declining function of the share of educated individuals,
and shows that the marginal product of human capital should be declining
in the amount of the human capital that is available in the economy. We
assume that
a  (0 + 1)b  e > 0. (3)
This implies that education investment is desirable in the absence of taxes
at least for all individuals i with Ei  1 and rules out some uninteresting
corner solutions.
A tax t will be chosen that is paid by all individuals who have invested in
education, and, hence, earn the education premium (1). Taxes are redistrib-
uted on a lump-sum basis, similar to the classical analysis of redistributive
taxation in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Accordingly, the government bud-
get constraint requires that the transfer payment to each individual is equal
to t. In a more narrow interpretation, t could also be seen as tuition fees.
However, we follow the more general interpretation of a less specic tax in
what follows.
Individualsperceived payo¤s depend on their own education choice, the
education choices of others, the size of the tax, and their own level of con-
dence. For simplicity, individuals will be risk neutral. The perceived payo¤
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of an individual who invests in education is
i(t; e) = Ei(a  b)  (1  )t  e. (4)
The expected payo¤ for an individual who does not invest in education and
hence, does not earn an education premium is equal to
i(t; 0)  t. (5)
In what follows we characterize the investment choices for di¤erent levels of
taxes, and concentrate on pure strategy equilibria only.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium share of individuals investing in education
is uniquely determined for all t  0. The equilibrium share is
(t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 + 1 if t 2 [0; a  (0 + 1)b  e]  T1
a e t
b
if t 2 (a  (0 + 1)b  e; a  0b  e)  T2
0 if t 2 [a  0b  e; ha  0hb  e]  T3
ah e t
bh
if t 2 [ha  0hb  e; ha  e)  T4
0 if t 2 [ha  e;1)  T5
(6)
Proof. For their investment decision, individuals i compare their payo¤
i(t; e) from investing with their payo¤ i(t; 0) from not investing, and these
values depend on the share  of other individuals who invest in education.
All i 2 A2 never invest in education, regardless of what any other indi-
vidual does, as i(t; e) =  e  (1  )t < t for any tax t  0 and any share
  0.
Consider i 2 A0 [ A1. For any , i(t; 0) = t for both i 2 A0 and
i 2 A1, whereas i(t; e) > j(t; e) if i 2 A0 and j 2 A1. Accordingly, all
highly condent individuals invest if at least some just condent individuals
invest, and none of the just condent individuals invests if at least some of
the highly condent individuals abstain from investing.
Consider a tax t 2 T1 = [0; a  (0+1)b e]. Individuals i 2 A1 invest if
i(t; e) > i(t; 0), which can be written equivalently as a b e t > 0. For
all   0 + 1 this inequality is fullled for all t 2 T1. All individuals from
A1 and, a fortiori, all individuals from A0 invest, and this yields  = 0+1
as the unique equilibrium share (t) for i 2 T1.
Consider a tax t 2 T2 = (a  (0 + 1)b  e; a  0b  e). Note that
(t) =
a  e  t
b
(7)
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is an equilibrium share for t 2 T2. All i 2 A0 strictly prefer to invest if they
believe that the share of other individuals who invest is equal to (t) as in
(7) as they prefer to invest if ha  hb  e  t > 0, and inserting (7) into this
condition yields (h   1)(e + t) > 0, which is fullled as h > 1. All i 2 A1
are just indi¤erent whether to invest; this can be conrmed by inserting (7)
into the indi¤erence condition a  b  e  t = 0. Hence, a measure equal to
 0 of individuals from A1 may invest, making the belief (7) just fullled.
There are uncountably many combinations of investment choices of indi-
viduals from A1 that yield (7). However, the share (7) is the unique equilib-
rium share for t 2 T2. Suppose there is a second equilibrium share ^ 6= a e tb .
Note that it must hold that ^ 2 [0; 0 + 1]. Note further that for t 2 T2,
ha  hb  e  t > 0 is fullled for all ^ 2 [0; 0+1]. Hence, all individuals
i 2 A0 invest. Therefore, ^ 2 [0; 0 + 1]. If ^ 2 (0; 0 + 1), then this
requires that all i 2 A1 must be just indi¤erent about whether to invest. But
the indi¤erence condition for them is a  b  e  t = 0 and has one unique
solution which is (7). It remains to show that ^ = 0 and ^ = 0 + 1 are
not equilibrium shares. For ^ = 0, all individuals i 2 A0[A1 strictly prefer
to invest, leading to a share of individuals who invest equal to 0+1 6= 0,
hence, a contradiction. For ^ = 0 + 1 only i 2 A0 prefer to invest, all
i 2 A0 prefer not to invest. This yields a group of individuals who invest
which constitutes a share  = 0 6= 0 + 1, and, hence, a contradiction.
Consider now taxes in the interval T3 = [a   0b   e; ha   0hb   e].
Individuals i 2 A1 invest (and i 2 A0 invest a fortiori then) if a b e t > 0.
For t > a 0b  e this inequality cannot be fullled for any  > 0. Hence,
for taxes t > a 0b e; it cannot be optimal for i 2 A1 to invest in education.
Consider then i 2 A0. They prefer to invest if ha hb e t > 0. Note that
this inequality is strictly fullled for all t 2 T3nfha 0hb eg for all   0,
implying that  = 0 is the only belief that is consistent with equilibrium
behavior. Finally, for t = ha  0hb  e , the condition ha  hb  e  t > 0
is fullled for all  < 0, implying that  = 0 is the only equilibrium belief
for this tax as well.
Consider now taxes in the interval T4 = [ha 0hb e; ha e). Such high
taxes are not compatible with  > 0, implying that only individuals with
high condence may invest. Individuals i 2 A0 invest if ha hb  e  t  0.
However, ha  0hb  e  t < 0, implying that less than all highly condent
individuals invest in the equilibrium. Note that
(t) =
ah  e  t
bh
(8)
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Figure 1: The equilibrium relationship between t and the share (t) of indi-
viduals who invest in education.
is the unique solution to the indi¤erence condition ha  hb  e  t = 0. For
this, and only for this , all individuals from A0 are indi¤erent to whether
to invest.
Finally, consider the interval T5 = [ha e;1). In this interval, ha hb 
e   t < 0 even for the smallest feasible   0. All individuals prefer not to
invest and  = 0 is the only equilibrium belief.
The equilibrium relationship between t and the share (t) of individuals
who invest in education.The equilibrium relationship between t and the share
(t) of individuals who invest in education.
The function (t) is displayed in Figure 1, and its curvature is intuitively
plausible. A very low tax will not prevent individuals who expect to gain
a premium from investing in education that strictly exceeds their education
cost, and the higher the tax on the education premium, the smaller the group
of individuals who decide to invest. For a su¢ ciently high tax all individuals
prefer not to invest. The steps in the function (t) result from the jumps in
condence levels Ei between the three types of individuals considered.
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3 Tax preferences
For the discussion of tax preferences it is useful to dene some of the limits
of the tax intervals in proposition 1 explicitly. The highest tax rate at which
all individuals except individuals with very little condence invest is
t  a  (0 + 1)b  e. (9)
For higher tax rates, some just condent individuals do not invest. In this
range, the relationship between t and  in the equilibrium is described by (7).
Once the tax rate is su¢ ciently high, all just condent individuals decide not
to invest and only the highly condent individuals invest. The smallest tax
rate for which this is true is
t  a  0b  e. (10)
The largest tax rate for which this is true is
t  ha  h0b  e. (11)
For higher tax rates in the range T4, only some of the highly condent indi-
viduals invest and the relationship between t and  is described by (8). From
a certain tax rate onwards, however, no single individual will invest. This
critical tax rate is
t  ha  e.
For the analysis that follows we make the following assumption that is an
implicit assumption about the elasticity of the tax base:
b < min

a  e
2(0 + 1)
;
ha  e
2h0

. (12)
Condition (12) implies that (t)t is non-increasing in t both for t 2 T2 and
t 2 T4. This makes it easier to single out the most preferred tax rates from
the perspective of individuals from the sets A0, A1 and A2. It will turn out
that we can concentrate on comparing preferences about the tax rates t, t
and t.
Proposition 2 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A2 is t or t. They strictly prefer t to t if
(a  (0 + 1)b  e)(0 + 1) > (ha  h0b  e)0 (13)
and t to t if the reverse inequality holds.
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Proof. Individuals i 2 A2 choose t that maximizes (t)t. This maximum
is in the range [t; t] as (t)t is strictly monotonically increasing in t for
t < t and (t)t = 0 for all t  t. The elasticity condition (12) further
simplies the problem, as b < a e
2(0+1)
implies that d((t)t)
dt
< 0 in the range
t 2 T2, and b < ha e2h0 implies that
d((t)t)
dt
< 0 in the range t 2 T4. Hence,
the maximum for (t)t is reached for t or t. Inserting (9) and (11) yields
(t)t > (t)t if and only if (13) holds.
Intuitively, the individuals with little condence would like to maximize
redistributed tax revenue as this is redistributed on a per capita basis. They
face the usual La¤er-curve problem: a larger tax rate will reduce the tax base,
because fewer of the more condent individuals invest. Given that the tax
revenue is declining in the interior of T2 and T4, the tax revenue curve (t)t
peaks either at t or at t, and condition (13) discriminates between these
two cases.
We now turn to the just condent group of individuals.
Proposition 3 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A1 is t = 0 or t. They strictly prefer t = 0 if and only if
a  (0 + 1)b  e > (ha  h0b  e)0 (14)
and t if the reverse inequality holds.
Proof. For t > t, individuals i 2 A1 do not invest, and their pay-
o¤ for this range of taxes is (t)t. By (12) (t)t is monotonically de-
creasing in t for t 2 T4 and constant and equal to zero for even higher
t. Moreover, (t)t is monotonically increasing in t for t 2 T3. Hence,
t = argmaxt2T3[T4[T5 [(t)t].
For t 2 T1; individuals i 2 A1 strictly prefer to invest in education. Their
payo¤ is (a   (0 + 1)b   e)   (1   (0 + 1))t and strictly decreases in t.
For t 2 T2, individuals are indi¤erent to whether to invest or not to invest.
Accordingly, their payo¤ equals (t)t, and by (12) it decreases in t in this
interval. Finally, the payo¤ is a continuous function of t at t. This shows
that the just condent individuals strictly prefer t = 0 among all t 2 T1[T2.
Whether i 2 A1 prefers t = 0 or t = t, the equilibrium payo¤ for
individuals i 2 A1 for these taxes needs to be compared. The left-hand side
in (14) is the payo¤ from t = 0 and the right-hand side of (14) is the payo¤
from t = t.
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Consider nally i 2 A0. The following proposition holds for the group of
individuals with high condence:
Proposition 4 The tax rate that is most preferred by individuals from group
A0 is t = 0 or some t 2 T2 with t > t. Their most preferred tax is t = t if
h >
a  e
b
  20 + 1 (15)
and
(ha  h0b  e)  (1  0)[a  0b  e] > ha  h(0 + 1)b  e. (16)
Proof. The perceived payo¤of a highly condent individual from making
the individually optimal choice to invest or not to invest is
(ha  h(t)b  e)  (1  (t))t for t 2 T1 [ T3 [ T3
(t)t for t 2 T4 [ T5. (17)
For t 2 T1, the equilibrium (t) = const: with respect to a small increase in t,
and, hence, the payo¤ of the highly condent individuals (17) decreases in t
for t 2 T1. All i 2 A0 strictly prefer t = 0 to t = t. Also, for t 2 T3; a similar
argument applies, and t = t is strictly preferred to t = t. For t 2 T4[T5;
all i 2 A0 in the equilibrium weakly or strictly prefer not to invest. Their
perceived payo¤ is therefore equal to (t)t in this range, and, by b < ha e
2h0
from condition (12), (t)t is decreasing in t for t 2 T4 and constant (and
equal to zero) for t 2 T5. Among all t 2 T3 [ T4 [ T5, they strictly prefer
t. All this together implies that the perceived payo¤ of i 2 A0 must take
its maximum on t = 0 or on some t 2 [t +; t], for some strictly positive
, hence, for a tax that is strictly higher than t. This shows the rst part
of proposition 4.
In the range t 2 T2 an increase in t increases the perceived gross income
for i 2 A0 by @(Ei(a (t)b) e)@t = h, and it increases the individuals tax (net of
transfers received) by @[1 (t))t]
@t
= 2t a+e
b
+ 1. Accordingly, a corner solution
at t = t is obtained if h   2(a 0b e) a+e
b
  1  0, which condition can
be written equivalently as (15). The condition (16) compares the perceived
payo¤ at this tax t with the perceived payo¤ for t = 0.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 characterize the tax rates that members of the
respective groups prefer most. It seems to be plausible that members of the
group A2 who never invest in education, never pay the tax and simply receive
redistributions from the total tax revenue prefer higher tax rates than other
condence types. However, this is not generally the case:
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Figure 2: The most condent prefer t, the just condent prefer t = 0 and
the invididuals with low condence prefer t with 0 < t < t in the shaded
area which is drawn for 0 ! 0 and 1 = 0:75.
Proposition 5 If the set A0 is su¢ ciently small then i 2 A1 prefer the
lowest tax rate t = 0, i 2 A2 most prefer t, and i 2 A0 most prefer a tax
rate that may exceed the tax t. Their most preferred tax is t if h 1 > a e
b
and h1 > a eb hold.
Proof. For a proof, consider 0 ! 0.
For 0 = 0, condition (13) becomes 0 < a  1b  e, which is fullled by
(3). Hence, by proposition 2, t is the most preferred tax for i 2 A2.
For 0 = 0, condition (14) reduces to the same condition 0 < a 1b  e.
Hence, by proposition 3, t = 0 is the most preferred tax for i 2 A1.
For 0 = 0, for i 2 A0, the conditions (15) and (16) reduce to h > a eb +1
and h1 > a eb .
Proposition 5 shows that the individuals with high condence who will
invest in education and pay the tax may favor a higher tax than the just
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condent or even the individuals who have low condence and who never
pay this tax but receive redistributions from it. It is important to notice
that this range is non-empty. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The shaded
area denes such a parameter range of h and (a  e)=b. Conditions (3), (12),
(13), (14), (15) and (16) must hold. For 0 ! 0, (3), (13) and (14) reduce
to a e
b
> 1. The rst condition in (12) reduces to a eb > 21, hence, a
strightly tighter condition. The second condition in (12) is trivially fullled
for 0 ! 0. Condition (15) reduces to a eb < h  1, and (16) to a eb < 1h.
The intuition for the result is perhaps more straightforward than the
calculations that lead to proposition 5. Individuals with little condence
who never invest in education would like to maximize the total tax revenue
that can be redistributed, because this maximizes the transfers they receive.
As is well known from standard La¤er curve arguments, the tax revenue
is not maximized for the maximum tax that is feasible. People with high
condence are guided by a di¤erent consideration. They know they will invest
in education and expect a high wage premium from education. This premium
will be higher, the smaller the number of other individuals who invest in
education, as scarcity of human capital will drive up the wage premium
from education. For this reason, they are willing to accept a considerable
tax if this tax prevents a su¢ ciently large number of other individuals from
investing in education, such that the increase in their expected gross wage
premium from deterring others from investing in education exceeds their
additional cost of tax payments required to make this deterrence e¤ective.
Proposition 5, together with Figure 2, illustrates that this can really be the
case and the analysis suggests that the full e¤ect is more likely to be at work
if individuals with high condence are very condent, and if their number is
small in comparison to the number of individuals who have an intermediate
condence level.
Proposition 5 is a possibility result only, and, in its extreme format, it
might perhaps be considered as less plausible. However, the result highlights
a general and important e¤ect that applies even if the counterintuitive result
of proposition 5 does not apply in a strict sense. High taxes on an education
premium are less painful for those who invest in education, as there is a
counterbalancing e¤ect. The higher tax reduces education investment and
this drives up the scarcity rents for those who invest. This counterbalancing
e¤ect may reduce the resistance to higher taxes even among those who invest
in education and pay these taxes. From this perspective, proposition 5 mainly
states that this counterbalancing e¤ect can be very strong, indeed.
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4 The data and the empirical strategy
In this section we turn to the empirical relationship between perceptions
about own ability and redistributional preferences. We use a data set that
has been obtained from a survey of 2000 individuals that Thomas Piketty
conducted in France in 1998 with nancial support from the McArthur Foun-
dation.7 The data set contains 65 variables and includes income, many socio-
demographic characteristics and answers to questions on social, political,
ethical, and cultural issues.
In line with the theoretical analysis in sections 2 and 3 that considers
individuals who choose their human capital investment and do not yet know
whether their own investment will be successful, we consider only individuals
aged 18-25. This reduces the size of the sub-sample used to 321 observations.
The endogenous variable to be explained is preferences for redistribu-
tive taxation, or the desire for redistribution. The data set provides several
measures for an individuals preferences with regard to income redistribution.
We concentrate on the following three questions to construct the variables we
use. The rst variable is the respondentsanswer to the question According
to you, taxes should be increased or not?(dumimp). The second and third
variables are constructed from two questions regarding the monthly wage of
a shopkeeper. One question is According to you, what should the average
monthly wage of a shopkeeper be?(revsouhcaiss) and the other is Accord-
ing to you, what is the average monthly wage of a shopkeeper?(revcaiss).
The answers to these questions were used by Piketty (1999) to construct
an indirect measure of the desired redistribution. More precisely, we have
used the answer to the question what should be. . .  (revsouhcaiss) and
the variable (revmoy) concerning the respondents beliefs about the average
household income. We do this in order to control for the possible di¤erences
in individualsperception of average incomes in the population. An alterna-
tive to this procedure has been to construct a new variable (di¤revsoucaiss)
as the ratio: [revsouhcaiss] / [revcaiss]. This ratio solves the problem of con-
7The survey « Attitudes towards inequality, France 1998 » was conceived by T.
Piketty and nanced by the MacArthur Foundation, within the Fondations Research
Network on the E¤ects of Inequality on Economic Performance. The survey was im-
plemented as a special module to the survey « Conditions de vie et aspirations des
Français » run by Credoc in june 1998 using a national representative sample of
about 2000 individuals. For a detailed description see Piketty (1999) and the web:
http://www.jourdan.ens.fr/piketty/ineg98/ineg98.htm.
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trolling for the heterogeneity of the beliefs on the average household income
level in a direct way.
We also conducted some estimates using other variables, e.g. opinrmi,
dened as the answer to According to you, the RMI (minimum income)
should be increased, maintained, decreased, suppressed?, that look attrac-
tive at the rst glance. We do not reproduce the estimation results here as
the estimations turned out to be inconclusive.
We need an explanatory variable that measures the respondentscon-
dence. For this purpose, we try to correctly identify the group of respondents,
who, for the right or wrong reason, are very condent about their ability to
turn human capital investment into own productivity, and use it to consider
the explanatory power of high condence for the desire for redistribution.
The data set allows for constructing several variables that can be considered
as proxies for an individuals own perceptions about talent or the ability to
turn human capital investment into high own productivity.
We constructed several variables to measure condence and report re-
sults only on the following four. The rst measure of condence is based
on the idea that highly condent individuals should self-select and choose
to become students. Hence, we chose a dummy variable (dumstud) which
takes value 1 if the respondent is a student, and zero otherwise. The second
measure of condence uses the questions concerning the perceived determi-
nants of own professional success: the respondent has been asked whether
he/she thinks that success depends on e¤ort or, alternatively, on uncontro-
lable events. Based on this question, we dene the dummy explicreuss2 that
is 1 if the respondent believes in e¤ort as the determinant of individual suc-
cess and 0 otherwise. The dummy overconf1 is constructed by multiplying
dumstud and explicreuss2. It captures the following condition of perceived
high ability: student and believing in e¤ort as the determinant of own suc-
cess. The third measure of condence uses respondentsanswers with regard
to their future prospects (how things will be in the next 5 years). The re-
spective dummy variable is opin5ans2 and takes on the value 1 if the answer
is better than nowand 0 if the answer is similar to or worse than now.
Using this dummy, we construct the dummy (overconf2 ): student with posi-
tive/very positive future prospects. The fourth denition of high condence
captures the students with positive future prospects who, in addition, believe
in e¤ort as the reason for success (as in denition 2). To build the corre-
sponding dummy (overcon¤utur), taking values 0 and 1, we simply multiply
the dummies dumstud, opin5ans and explicreuss2.
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Our empirical strategy is to test for the explanatory power of di¤erent
denitions of condence for the preference for redistribution. The empirical
relationship or reduced form model is as follows: the desire for redistribu-
tive taxation (or, alternatively, the intensity of redistribution preferences)
is explained as a function of dummies that capture perceived own ability
and other variables such as income and further socio-demographic variables.
We use the measures of redistributional preferences discussed above as the
endogenous variables, the various measures of condence as an explanatory
variable, and use income, socio-demographic variables (age, gender, size of
the area where the respondent lives, profession of the parents, etc.) as further
controls.
In order to adjust a model for dumimp, given the binary nature of the
variable, we estimate a discrete choice model (a probit in our case). When
the endogenous variable was the question what should the monthly wage
be...or the ratio di¤revsoucaiss we use an OLS regression.
In general, the estimations su¤ered from the small size of the sub-sample
we used. In particular, the number of observations which have a 1 for
the variables constructed in a more sophisticated way is small (see Table
1). Some of the empirical models we have estimated failed to pass the tests
of robustness. In particular, in the case of the discrete choice models, we
eliminated all the estimations with a predictive power lower than 80% (i.e.
the percentage of correctly predicted 1 and 0 was lower than 0.8). Table 1
provides denitions of variables. In tables 2, 3 and 4, we present a selection of
results that, in our opinion, are relevant from an econometric point of view.
Also, we report only the variables and their respective coe¢ cients if the level
of signicance is above 90 percent. In table 2 the dependent variable is the
dummy about tax preferences (dumimp). In table 3 the endogenous variable
is di¤revsoucaiss, the relation between the desired and estimated monthly
wage of a shopkeeper as discussed above. Finally, in table 4, we use the
question about shopkeeper monthly income (i.e: what should the monthly
income of a shopkeeper be?) as a measure of attitude toward inequality.
The coe¢ cient of the income variable revfoy2 is negative and signicant
in all these estimations. This result is in line with the related previous em-
pirical ndings and with economic intuition according to which low income
earners expect to benet from redistribution. More surprisingly, in some
cases, we nd that the measure of perceived own high ability is positively
correlated with the intensity of the taste for redistribution. This is particu-
larly true in the case of the rst denition of perceived own high ability in
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which, independently of the measure of the redistributive preferences used,
the coe¢ cient of the dummy that captures high ability (dumstud) is always
positive and signicant (at the 10 percent level), as reported in the rst set of
regressions in each table. This is in line with the view that individuals who
perceive their own ability as high and, hence, self select to become students,
may favor more redistribution.
However, we are very reluctant to draw any general conclusions. The em-
pirical results are not very robust, the theoretical relation between condence
and redistributional preferences has been shown to depend on distributional
parameters that have no counterpart in the empirical estimation, and the
qualitatively unambiguous empirical results can be assigned to a number of
theoretical considerations. For instance, when we change the denition of
the respondents perception of own ability, the coe¢ cients of the correspond-
ing dummies are not signicant (see the second set of results in table 2 and
all the other regressions of table 4). Still, dumstud remains signicant and
with a positive sign: the probability of having high redistributive preferences
is positively a¤ected by the choice of being a student. Moreover, using the
ratio di¤revsouhcaiss as a measure of redistributive preference and the sta-
tus student and believing in e¤ort as the denition of perceptions of high
own ability (second set of regressions in table 3), we get that the coe¢ cient
of dumstud still remain positive and signicant but, the coe¢ cient of the
dummy overconf1 appears to be signicant and negative.
To conclude, the relationship between perceived own ability and prefer-
ences for income redistribution is not straightforward, but we could show
that the two variables are not necessarily negatively correlated.
5 Conclusions
Individuals who perceive their own talent to be very high may favor a high
income tax as a barrier to entry that prevents those individuals investing in
education, who perceive their own ability to be less high. The tax reduces the
share of individuals who invest in human capital and increases the scarcity
rent that accrues to those individuals who invest. We showed that this e¤ect
can, but need not, dominate its cost in terms of the high taxes to be paid
that comes along with this policy. As a result, individuals who are very
condent about their own ability may prefer taxes that are even higher than
those wanted by people who benet from the increased redistribution that is
18
nanced by these taxes. The empirical implication of the result is that highly
condent individuals should articulate a preference for more redistribution.
We cannot test a very specic hypothesis in the empirical analysis, but we
do nd evidence that, for this or other reasons, is in line with the theoretical
results. Overall the result can be interpreted as showing that there is no
general conict between the poor and uneducated on the one side and the
rich and educated on the other, with the former asking for more redistribution
and the latter for less, but that there are forces that can make the opposite
redistributional preferences possible.
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Table 1.  Description of the variables used and his label. 
 
Dumimp Dummy: 1 if the individual wants more taxes; 0 otherwise Nº of 0 : 184 ; Nº of 1: 137  
Dumstud Dummy: 1 if student; 0 otherwise Nº of 0 : 192 ; Nº of 1: 129 
Revfoy2 Income of the household in which the individual lives (in annual French francs) Mean = 134903 ; standard dev. = 97364 
Profpere2 Father’s profession (4 types): 1 (self employed), 2 (white collar), 3 (blue collar), 4 (pensioner) Nº of 1 : 82 ; Nº of 2: 45; Nº of 3 : 151 ; Nº of 4: 43 
Profmere2 Mother’s profession (4 types): 1 (self employed), 2 (white collar), 3 (blue collar), 4 (pensioner) Nº of 1 : 31 ; Nº of 2: 48; Nº of 3 : 229 ; Nº of 4: 13 
Sex 1 if boy, 2 if girl Nº of 1 : 143 ; Nº of 2: 178 
Age Age Mean = 21.6 ; standard dev. = 2.3 
Opinrmi2 Answer about the RMI: the RMI (minimum income) should be increased (4), maintained (3), 
decreased (2), suppressed (1) 
Nº of 1 : 13 ; Nº of 2: 8; Nº of 3 : 99 ; Nº of 4: 197  
Agglo2 Size of agglomeration in which the respondent lives (in increasing categories):  
1 (less than 50.000 inhabitants); 2 (between 50 000 and 200.000); 3 (more than 200.000) 
Nº of 1 : 139 ; Nº of 2: 43; Nº of 3 : 139 
Revsouhcaiss Desired (by the respondent) monthly income of a shopkeeper (French Francs) Mean = 7255 ; standard dev. = 1554 
Revcaiss Estimated (by the respondent) monthly income of a shopkeeper (French Francs) Mean = 5755; standard dev. = 992 
Revmoy Estimated (by the respondent) average monthly household income (French Francs) Mean = 10123; standard dev. = 4342 
Diffrevsocaiss Revsouhcaiss/revcaiss Mean = 1.26 ; standard dev. = 0.22 
Explicreuss2 Dummy; 1 if respondent believes in effort as the main determinant of individual success;  
0 if he/she believes in other incontrollable factors 
Nº of 0 : 233 ; Nº of 1: 88 
Overconf1 Explicreuss2*dumstud Nº of 0 : 288 ; Nº of 1: 33 
Opin5ans2 Dummy: 1 if respondent thinks that in the next 5 years own economic conditions will be better 
then they are now; 0 otherwise 
Nº of 0 : 149 ; Nº of 1: 172 
Overconf2 Opin5ans2*dumstud Nº of 0 : 262 ; Nº of 1: 59 
Overconffutur 
(overconfid-r) 
Opin5ans2*dumstud*explicreuss2 Nº of 0 : 304 ; Nº of 1: 17 
 
 
Table 2.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: question about taxes (dumimp).  
Probit, dependent variable: dumimp (1 if more taxes, 0 otherwise). 
 
definition of  
high confidence age 18-25 and student age 18-25, student believing in effort 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z 
revfoy2 -1.76E-06 9.02E-07 0.052 -1.78E-06 9.09E-07 0.000 
dumstud 0.3741264 0.2131325 0.079 0.398167 0.2397785 0.097 
explicreuss2    -0.0898737 0.2265374 0.692 
overconf1    -0.1004084 0.3740957 0.788 
age 0.0620315 0.0415555 0.136  0.0607089 0.0419 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: relation between the desired and estimated (by the respondent) monthly wage of a 
shopkeeper (i.e: Which should be the monthly income of a shopkeeper?/ Which is the monthly income of a shopkeeper?).  
Ordinary Least Squares. Dependent variable: diffrevsouhcaiss. 
 
definition of  
high confidence age 18-25 and student age 18-25, student believing in effort 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z 
revfoy2 -2.26E-07 1.48E-07 0.128 -2.37E-07 1.43E-07 0.099 
dumstud 0.0661108 0.0372335 0.077 0.0967393 0.0424295 0.024 
explicreuss2    -0.0225034 0.0341603 0.511 
overconf1    -0.11994 0.0584527 0.041 
_Iprofpere-2 0.0754316 0.042328 0.076 0.0700318 0.0409939 0.089 
age 0.017502 0.0066796 0.009 0.016824 0.0064848 0.01 
_cons 0.8683943 0.160896 0 0.8864374 0.1567114 0 
 
Table 4.  Measure of attitude toward inequality: question about shopkeeper monthly income  
(i.e: Which should be the monthly income of a shopkeeper?). OLS. Dependent variable: revsouhcaiss. 
 
definition of 
high confidence age 18-25 and student 
age 18-25,  
student believing in effort 
age 18-25, student and 
positive/very positive on his 
future condition (next 5 years) 
age 18-25, student,  
believing in effort and 
positive/very positive on his 
future condition (next 5 years) 
 Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z Coef. Std. Err. P > z
revmoy 0.071396 0.0189503 0 0.0740287 0.0192782 0 0.0773396 0.018718 0 0.0736915 0.0187817 0
revfoy2 -0.0002895 0.0008303 0.728 -0.0001126 0.0008182 0.891 0.000088 0.0008468 0.917 -0.0006818 0.0008919 0.445
dumstud 672.0402 246.5485 0.007 798.4154 280.2058 0.005 746.3918 321.3293 0.021 723.2077 267.7921 0.007
explicreuss2  -54.41921 237.3512 0.819 -35.812 216.517 0.869
opin5ans2  149.294 212.3613 0.483 170.0322 184.8875 0.359
overconf1  -423.3885 423.2037 0.318
overconf2  -51.33481 378.4187 0.892
overconfid-r  -646.4981 523.4482 0.218
_Iprofpere-2 760.3251 284.3135 0.008 723.0515 283.0438 0.011 677.1683 288.2462 0.02 566.2561 297.6039 0.058
_Iprofmere-4 333.2898 360.4273 0.356 408.1264 356.2426 0.253 645.4761 345.6986 0.063 854.1951 440.9801 0.054
_cons 5006.517 1124.001 0 4766.594 1109.858 0 4429.689 1151.394 0 3977.047 1124.134 0
 
